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JUDICIAL IMMUNITY - STATE JUDICIAL OFFICIALS ARE
NOT IMMUNE FROM PROSPECTIVE RELIEF IN AN ACTION
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.c. § 1983 OR FROM PAYING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PREVAILING PARTIES PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. § 1988. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
Two Virginia residents were arrested for misdemeanors for which
the maximum penalty in each case was a monetary fine. I A county magistrate committed both men to jail because each failed to meet the bail
she had imposed. 2 The two residents brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 3 to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional practice of incarcerating
persons awaiting trial for non-incarcerable offenses. 4 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia declared the practice
unconstitutional, granted the injunction against the magistrate, and
awarded the residents costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, rejecting the magistrate's argument that
principles of judicial immunity barred an award of attorney's fees against
her.6 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because
judicial immunity did not bar the injunctive relief sought, the attorney's
fees award was proper. 7
Judicial immunity is a common law doctrine that evolved from
twelfth century English appellate proceedings.s Initially, unsatisfied litigants could "appeal" a lower court's decision by bringing a personal ac1. Richmond Allen was arrested for breach of the peace in violation of VA. CODE
§ 18.2-416 (1982) (maximum penalty is a $500 fine). Jesse Nicholson was arrested
for being drunk in public in violation of VA. CODE § 18.2-388 (1982) (maximum
penalty is a $100 fine). See Allen v. Burke, No. 81-0040A, slip op. (E.D. Va. June 4,
1981) reprinted in Joint Appendix accompanying Petition For Writ of Certiorari,
Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984), ajJ'd, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), ajJ'd
sub nom. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
2. Allen v. Burke, No. 81-0040A, slip op. (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981), ajJ'd, 690 F.2d 376
(4th Cir. 1982), ajJ'd sub nom. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
4. In the five months preceding the residents' suit, the magistrate had committed at
least 34 persons charged with non-incarcerable offenses to jail for failure to post
bond. Allen v. Burke, No. 81-0040A, slip op. at 26 (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981), ajJ'd,
690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), ajJ'd sub nom. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970
(1984).
5. Id. at 19-20. For the relevant text of 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1982), see infra note 52.
6. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), ajJ'd sub nom. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.
Ct. 1970 (1984).
7. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1971-72 (1984).
8. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 664-68 (2d ed.
1968). For a survey of English common law origins of judicial immunity, see 6 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 234-40 (2d ed. 1937); Block, Stump
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tion against its members for false judgment. 9 Judges appointed by the
monarch, however, could not be accused of false judgment, rather they
could only be directed to provide a record of their actions to the appellate
court. IO This record was incontestable and provided immunity for the
judge, as agent of the monarch, for any act that appeared in the record. I I
Any act done outside the proper jurisdiction of the court would not appear in the record and was therefore not privileged as a judicial act.12
In the seventeenth century, to quell competition by rival courts,
Lord Coke and the members of the King's Bench expanded the doctrine
of immunity.13 The justification for this expansion was that the common
law courts of record derived their authority from the Kingl4 and therefore should not be subject to collateral interference from courts such as
the Admiralty court, the Chancery acting as an equity court, and the
Star Chamber. ls Coke's broad application of the technical distinction
between courts of record and courts not of record resulted in a broader
privilege for members of superior common law courts. Judges of superior common law courts were afforded absolute and universal immunity
for any judicial act whether done within or without the court's jurisdiction, while inferior common law court justices were immune only for
judicial acts done within their limited jurisdiction. 16 Although this different treatment of superior and inferior court justices eventually subsided, the underlying policy for judicial immunity remained constant: to
ensure that each judge "may be free in thought and independent in
judgment." 17

9.
10.

II.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879; Feinman &
Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 20 (1980).
2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 666-68.
Id. at 668.
See I HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ~ 206 (Lord Hailsham 4th ed. 1973) ("the
record of a court of record cannot, if subsisting and valid upon its face, be traversed
in any action against the judge of that court"). A court of record is one "where the
acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial
and testimony; which rolls are called the records of the court, and are of such high
and supereminent authority, that their truth is not to be called in question." 5 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 157 n.1 (3d ed. 1945) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 24).
1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note II, ~ 212; see also Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at 206.
5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8 at 157-60; Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at
207-10.
See Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1607) (common law courts of
record are answerable only to the monarch); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1607).
Miller v. Searle, [1777] 2 Wm.BI. 1141, 1145, quoted in Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1
Q.B. 118, 135. For a thorough discussion of the development of the doctrine of
judicial immunity since Lord Coke, see Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. at 132-50;
Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at 210-21.
Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. at 132 (quoting Garnett v. Ferrand, [1827] B. & c.
611, 625). This policy states:
This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual is given
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When the issue of judicial immunity first arose in American courts,
the judiciary looked to English law for guidance. In Yates v. Lansing, 18 a
state chancellor who had been sued for wrongly convicting and incarcerating the plaintiff claimed that his judicial office barred the action. Noting that the challenged act was one within the chancellor's proper
jurisdiction and agreeing with the policy supporting the doctrine of judicial immunity, the New York Supreme Court held that the action against
the chancellor was barred. 19 Other courts concurred with this opinion
and began to apply a doctrine of judicial immunity in varying degrees
and with different refinements. 2o A clear statement of an American rule
of judicial immunity, however, did not emerge until the Supreme Court
considered the issue.
In Randall v. Brigham21 and Bradley v. Fisher,22 the Supreme Court
first discussed judicial immunity which, according to the Court, "ha[d]
been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and
ha[d] never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country."23 Overlooking the inconsistent application of the doctrine in both
American and English courts,24 Justice Field, in Bradley, enunciated the
"settled" American rule of judicial immunity. Similar to the English dichotomy between superior and inferior courts,25 members of American
courts of general jurisdiction received a broader privilege than those of
courts of limited jurisdiction. While a judge of the former class was immune for any act 26 in a matter over which he had, or believed he had,
subject matter jurisdiction,27 the jurisdiction of the latter class was more
by the law to the judges, not so much for their own sake as for the sake of
the public, and for the advancement of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in judgment, as all who
are to administer justice ought to be.

ld.
18. 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), ajJ'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811).
19. ld. at 290-96; see Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at 227.
20. Compare Howe v. Mason, 14 Iowa 510 (1863) (immunity restricted to judicial acts
in good faith) and Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70 (1820) (liability for
acting under unconstitutional statute), with Lancaster v. Lane, 19 Ill. 242 (1857) (no
liability for wrongful fine of parties provided jurisdiction was proper) and Young v.
Herbert, 11 S.C.L. (Nott & McC.) 172 (1819) (immunity for magistrate who committed party to jail rather than imposing bail).
21. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1863).
22. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
23. ld. at 347. But see Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 146-49 (Lord Justice
Ormond discussing the varying application of judicial privilege in England between
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries); Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at 205.
24. See supra note 20 (American courts) and Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 146-49
(discussing inconsistent application in English courts).
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. Members of a court of general jurisdiction were also immune for any act allegedly
done with partiality, or done maliciously or corruptly. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 348.
27. ld. at 352. Justice Field noted that, in a court of general jurisdiction, the question of
jurisdiction is as vital as the issues relating to the causes of action, and therefore a
judge's good faith decision to accept jurisdiction should also be protected. If, how-
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clearly defined, and thus its members were not protected for any act done
without proper jurisdiction. 28 As in England, however, the dichotomy of
the Bradley immunity doctrine gradually dissipated and by the turn of
the century the tendency was toward equal treatment of all judicial
officials. 29
Since its pronouncements in Bradley, the Supreme Court has decided an issue of judicial immunity on only three occasions. Each of
these cases concerned a suit for damages against a judicial official. 30 In
Pierson v. Ray,3! the Court held judicial immunity to be an absolute defense to an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 32
Notwithstanding a strong dissent by Justice Douglas arguing that § 1983
contained no exception for judges, 33 the Pierson Court stated it would not
presume that Congress intended to abrogate the common law doctrine of
judicial immunity unless it "specifically so provided."34 In Stump v.
Sparkman,35 the Court's attention focused on determining when an act

28.
29.

30.

31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

ever, it is clear to the judge that the court has no jurisdiction, acts in excess of
jurisdiction are not excusable and are not exempt from liability. Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 351.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376,61 N.W. 1004 (1895) (immunity extended to justice of the peace who entered a good faith judgment that was void for
want of jurisdiction); Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576,49 N.W. 633 (1891) Gustices
of the peace are generally men of little legal education and therefore deserve at least
equal protection from liability afforded educated members of courts of general jurisdiction}; Austin v. Vrooman, 128 N.Y. 229, 28 N.E. 477 (1891) (similar extention of
privilege to a magistrate); Waugh v. Dibbens, 61 Ok!. 221, 160 P. 589 (1916) Gudges
of inferior courts are to be accorded the same privilege as judges of superior courts}.
See generally Feinman & Cohen, supra note 8, at 249-53.
Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984), is the first case before the Supreme Court
that concerns a suit for prospective relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity. Id. at 1974. All of the prior Supreme Court cases in this area involved suits for
damages against judges, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), or
for prospective relief against a judge acting in a legislative capacity, Supreme Court
of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
In Pierson, a group of white and black clergymen attempted to use a segregated bus
terminal waiting room in Jackson, Mississippi. They were arrested and charged
with conduct breaching the peace in violation of a Mississippi statute later determined to be unconstitutional. The clergymen waived a jury trial and were then
convicted by a municipal police justice. The clergymen then brought an action
against the police justice for damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 claiming that their
convictions were in violation of their civil rights. Finding that the police justice did
nothing "other than to adjudge petitioners guilty when their case came before his
court," 386 U.S. at 553, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of judicial immunity was an absolute defense. For an evaluation of Pierson, see Kates, Immunity of
State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 615 (1970).
386 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 554-55.
435 U.S. 349 (1978). In Stump a judge, acting on the ex parte application of a
young girl's mother, ordered the sterilization of the daughter without affording the
daughter notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to appeal. The daughter sued the
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by a judge constitutes a judicial act. It concluded that a judicial act is
any act that is judicial in character36 and that, if not in clear absence of
all jurisdiction,37 would be absolutely privileged by the doctrine of judicial immunity.38 Finally, in Butz v. Economou 39 the Court extended the
doctrine of absolute immunity to protect federal hearing examiners and
administrative law judges from damages suits. 4O To insulate judicial officials from personal liability in damages suits, the Supreme Court had
eliminated the Bradley distinction between courts of general and limited
jurisdiction.
Prior to Pulliam v. Allen,41 the Supreme Court had not had occasion
to determine whether the doctrine of judicial immunity would bar prospective relief sought under the civil rights statutes. 42 Although several
cases had been filed against state judges seeking such relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Court was able to reach a decision in each case without reaching the issue of judicial immunity.43 The seven United States
courts of appeals that have considered this issue, however, are in agreement that judicial immunity does not bar prospective relief against judicial officers.44 One of the most thorough opinions supporting this

36.

37.
38.

39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

judge for damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983. Id. at 351-55. For an analysis of Stump,
see Note, Torts - Judicial Immunity: A Sword For The Malicious Or A Shield For
The Conscientious? Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978),8 U. BALT. L. REV.
141 (1978).
435 U.S. at 362. The Court set out two factors for determining whether an act is a
"judicial" one: whether the act is one normally performed by a judge, and whether
the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Id.
Id. at 356-57.
Strictly applying the rule of Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), the
Stump Court clearly indicated that immunity attaches even when a judge's actions
are taken in error, done maliciously, in excess of his authority, 435 U.S. at 356, or
are "flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Id. at 359.
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
The Butz Court stated that "adjudication within a federal administrative agency
shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages." Id. at
512-13.
104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
Id. at 1974; see also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States, 446 U.S. 719, 735 n.13 (1980).
Eg., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (injunctive relief against judicial officers
not appealed); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (district court lacked article
III jurisdiction); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (same).
In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982);
WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981); Heimbach v. Village of Lyons,
597 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, vacated as moot, 583
F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978); Timmerman
v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, vacated sub nom. Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); cf
R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1232 n.9 (8th Cir.) (Eighth Circuit has expressly
declined to decide this issue), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
The district courts that have decided this issue are divided. Compare, e.g., Baier
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conclusion is the Seventh Circuit case of Littleton v. Berbling. 45 Littleton
concerned a suit under the civil rights statutes against several county
judges for engaging in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination.
Reasoning that the narrow holding in Pierson v. Ray 46 only preserved
judicial immunity in damages actions arising after the enactment of the
civil rights statutes,47 the Littleton court concluded that Pierson "does
not, of course, mean that [state judges] may not be enjoined from pursuing a course of unlawful conduct."48
Most of the circuit courts of appeals49 have in effect aligned themselves with Justice Douglas's dissenting view in Pierson. Douglas maintained that the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was to abrogate the immunity
of all persons acting under color of state law, including judges, regardless
of whether the relief sought was damages or injunction. 50 Still, the circuits were bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Pierson that, like
legislative immunity, judicial immunity from damages had survived the
enactment of the civil rights statutes. 51 Thus, the circuits interpreted
§ 1983 as abrogating judicial immunity from all actions except those for
damages.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award
Act (Act), which permits the award of costs and attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights suits. 52 Most courts have construed the
Act as abrogating the strict rule of judicial immunity from damages suits

45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
SO.

51.

52.

v. Parker, 523 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (M.D. La. 1981) (immunity) and Coleman v.
Court of Appeals, 550 F. Supp. 681, 683-84 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (same), with
Ashenhurst v. Carey, 351 F. Supp. 708, 712 n.3 (N.D. Ill., 1972) (no immunity) and
Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (E.D. Mo., 1969) (same), affd, 428 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143, rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. O'Shea V. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, vacated sub nom. Spomer V. Littleton, 414
U.S. 514 (1974).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Noting the Supreme Court's rejection of Justice Douglas's dissenting view in Pierson, the Littleton court pointed out that "[t]he [Pierson] Court did not consider the
issue of immunity from injunctive or other equitable relief." Littleton V. Berbling,
468 F.2d at 406.
[d. at 407 (quoting United States V. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 738 n.3 (5th Cir. 1967».
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Pierson V. Ray, 386 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Examining the precise
wording of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, quoted supra at note 3, Justice Douglas stated: "To
most, 'every person' would mean every person, not every person except judges. . . .
The congressional purpose seems to me to be clear." 386 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
The Pierson Court followed its reasoning in Tenney V. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (legislative record of § 1983 provides no clear indication that Congress intended to abolish legislative privilege), and concluded that Congress would have
been more specific had it intended to abolish the common law doctrine of judicial
immunity. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This section provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of
this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." [d.
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to the extent that the Act permits the award of attorney's fees, and have
accordingly upheld attorney's fees awards to plaintiffs who have been
granted prospective relief against state judges. 53 The Supreme Court in
dictum has implicitly followed this interpretation, noting in Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States 54 that "Congress intended to permit attorney's fees awards in cases in which prospective relief was properly awarded against defendants who would be
immune from damages awards."55 The Consumers Union Court, however, was able to avoid the issue of judicial immunity once more, because
the defendants in that case were sued in their legislative rather than judicial capacity. 56
In Pulliam v. Allen,57 the Supreme Court finally decided whether
judicial immunity bars prospective relief against state judicial officials.
Even though the magistrate in Pulliam had raised only the issue of the
attorney's fees award on appeal,58 the Court, in a five to four decision,
stated that its earlier ruling in Consumers Union required it first to determine whether principles of immunity barred the underlying relief
sought. 59 Finding no bar to the injunctive relief granted against the magistrate, the Court, following its interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in Consumers Union/'o affirmed the award of the attorney's fees. 61
53. See, e.g., Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.
1980); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1980). The Morrison court
examined the legislative history of § 1988 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). Noting that the House Report contained a footnote citing Pierson, see infra note 86, the Third Circuit concluded that
it was a "sufficient indication that Congress has exercised the choice left to it by
Pierson by enacting § 1988." 627 F.2d at 673.
54. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
55. Id. at 738-39.
56. In Consumers Union, the promoters of a legal services dictionary sought to enjoin
the Supreme Court of Virginia and its chief justice from enforcing a provision of the
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility that had been ruled unconstitutional.
The district court granted the injunction on the ground that the Virginia court, in its
legislative capacity, should have modified the Code, and awarded attorney's fees to
the prevailing plaintiff. Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n,
470 F. Supp. 1055, 1063 (E.D. Va. 1979), vacated sub nom. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). The Supreme
Court vacated the fee award on the ground that legislative immunity barred the
injunction and the fee award was therefore improper. 446 U.S. at 738-39. For a
discussion of Consumers Union, see Note, Official Immunity in Federal Court:
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 67 CORNELL L. REV. 188 (1981).
57. 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
58. The magistrate did not appeal the injunctive relief granted by the district court, nor
the award of court costs. The appeal raised only the issue of judicial immunity from
the award of attorney's fees and, in the alternative, that the fee award was excessive.
Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.
Ct. 1970 (1984).
59. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1973-74.
60. In Consumers Union, noting the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court
stated:
The House Committee Report on the Act indicates that Congress intended
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To support its approval of the prospective relief, the Court embarked on an analysis of the sources of the immunity doctrine, relying
primarily on analogous English common law principles62 and American
case law. 63 Drawing on conclusions from an admittedly different English
court system,64 the Court stated that "there was no inconsistency between a principle of immunity that protected judicial authority from a
'wide, wasting and harassing persecution'. . . and the availability of collateral injunctive relief in exceptional cases."65 In addition to this conclusion, the Court relied on two other factors in finding that judicial
immunity did not bar injunctive relief against the magistrate. First, it
found no English or American case holding judges immune from prospective relief. 66 Second, it noted that seven circuit courts of appeals had
affirmatively held immunity not to bar injunctive relief. 67
The Court next discussed the concerns for judicial independence
that may arise from SUbjecting judges to prospective relief. It did not
perceive the first concern - that judges would constantly have to defend
themselves against suits by disgruntled litigants - to pose a real threat to
judicial independence. 68 Citing earlier decisions in Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover 69 and Ex parte Fahey,70 the Court calculated that prospective
relief against state judges, either by direct or collateral action, could only
arise in rare and limited situations. 71 The only other concern - the independence of state officials from federal interference resulting from the
issuance of an injunction under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 72 - was summarily
dismissed as being a "matter of comity and federalism, independent of
to permit attorney's fees awards in cases in which prospective relief was
properly awarded against defendants who would be immune from damages awards, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.9 (1976), but there is no indication
that Congress intended to permit an award of attorney's fees to be premised on acts that themselves would be insulated from even prospective
relief.
446 U.S. at 738-39. For the relevant part of H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.9, see infra
note 86.
61. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1982.
62. Id. at 1974-78.
63. Id. at 1974 n.6.
64. The Court stated: "The relationship between the King's Bench and its collateral and
inferior courts is not precisely paralleled in our system by the relationship between
the state and federal courts." Id. at 1978.
65. Id. (quoting Taaffe v. Downes, 13 Eng. Rep. 15, 18 (Ir. 1813».
66.Id.
67. Id; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68. Id. at 1978-79.
69. 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (need to show an inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of
irreparable harm in order to obtain equitable relief).
70. 332 U.S. 258 (1947) (mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against a judge should
be reserved for extraordinary cases because they have the unfortunate consequence
of making the judge a litigant).
71. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1978-79.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for damages, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the text of § 1983, see supra note 3.
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principles of judicial immunity."73 The Court therefore concluded that
the arguments supporting judicial immunity from suits for damages were
not applicable to suits seeking prospective relief.
Finally, the Court looked to the statute upon which the cause of
action was based. Citing its earlier interpretations in Ex parte Virginia 74
and Mitchum v. Foster,7S the Court stated that "Congress intended
§ 1983 to be an independent protection for federal rights" and that there
is "nothing to suggest that Congress intended to expand the common-law
doctrine of judicial immunity to insulate state judges completely from
federal collateral review."76 Thus, having found no valid reason to disallow the injunctive relief awarded against the magistrate, the Court affirmed the award of the attorney's fees.
The dissent, led by Justice Powell, focused primarily on the propriety of assessing any fee award against a judge. Apparently ignoring the
Court's earlier interpretation of 42 U.S.c. § 1988 in Consumers Union,77
the dissent argued that by accepting a distinction between "attorney's
fees" and "damages" the majority "subordinates realities to labe1s."78
Briefly departing from this line of argument, the dissent raised two
other points of contention. It first cited the common law qualification
that immunity only bars suits against judges acting within the scope of
their jurisdiction, and noted that there was no allegation by the plaintiffs
in Pulliam that the magistrate was acting without jurisdiction. 79 Alternatively, the dissent claimed that even if collateral relief were granted
against a judicial officer, considerations of judicial independence would
require that costs be awarded "only against the party at interest and not
against the judge."80 To permit the award of attorney's fees against
judges would not only ignore this latter consideration, but also would
further threaten judicial independence by encouraging "harassing litiga73. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1979-80.
74. 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (because a state acts only through its legislative, executive, or
judicial authorities, the federal civil rights act provides a cause of action against
state judicial officials).
75. 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 is necessary to prevent injury to individuals
by state courts that sought to abrogate federally protected rights or were powerless
to stop their deprivation).
76. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981.
77. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719,
738-39 (1980).
78. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1982 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Smith v. Smith, 396 F.
Supp. 367, 369-70 (D. Or. 1973) (same policies that underlie judicial immunity from
damages suits prohibit the award of attorney's fees), affd mem., 579 F.2d 1376 (9th
Cir. 1975).
79. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1985 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1986 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent cited two United States Court of
Appeals decisions in support of this proposition. Id. at 1986-87 (Powell, J., dissenting). In both of those cases, however, the respondents in the mandamus actions
were federal, not state, judges. See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopedic Ass'n, 530
F.2d 536 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Haight & Freese Co., 164 F. 688 (1st Cir. 1908). But
cf 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1982) (§ 1988 allows fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs in, inter
alia, actions brought under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, which concerns state officials).
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tion" and increasing "its potential for intimidation" of judges. 8 !
The Supreme Court's decision in Pulliam v. AIlen 82 is significant in
several respects. It permitted the Court to state clearly what it could
only intimate in Consumers Union: 83 judicial immunity is not a bar to
prospective relief against a judicial officer acting in his judicial capacity.
Further, it enabled the Court to construe 42 U.S.c. § 1988 as permitting
attorney's fees awards against defendants who would otherwise be immune from damages awards. 84 Notwithstanding the result, however, the
reasoning of the Court leaves several questions unanswered.
The narrow issue before the Court in Pulliam was whether private
citizens should be forced to bear the cost of rectifying civil rights violations against them by state judges. 85 Rather than decide this issue by
construing the legislative history behind § 1988,86 both the majority and
the dissent opted for a debate on the propriety of sUbjecting judicial officers to prospective relief - an issue that the magistrate had not raised
on appeal. 87 Furthermore, in deciding this issue the Court failed entirely
to apply the two prong test for immunity from damages enumerated in
81. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1988 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
83. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719,
738-39 (1980).
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
85. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984)
(stating reason for granting the writ: "Immunity of a judicial officer from the payment of any attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is an important question of
federal law which has not been settled by this Court.").
86. The legislative history of § 1988 includes inconsistent statements regarding its intent
and purposes. Compare Senator Edward Kennedy's statement:
The bill now before us, Mr. President, does not create any new legal remedies, nor does it expand our civil rights laws into new areas which Congress has not previously considered. It merely lends substance to the
private enforcement of rights already authorized under existing civil rights
laws.
Furthermore, the bill will not create any new burdens for the courts.
Rather, it is intended simply to expressly authorize the courts to cQntinue
to make the kinds of awards of legal fees that they had been allowing prior
to the [Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975)] decision.
122 Congo Rec. 31,472 (1976), with the purpose of the Act according to the House
Committee Report:
Furthermore, while damages are theoretically available under the statutes
covered by H.R. 15460, it should be observed that, in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy.17 Consequently, awarding
counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. To be sure, in a large number of cases brought under
the provisions covered by H.R. 15460, only injunctive relief is sought, and
prevailing plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their counsel fees.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.9 (1976) (footnote 17 contains a citation to Pierson V.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
87. See supra note 58.
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Stump v. Sparkman. 88 An application of the factors considered in Stump
would have brought the Pulliam reasoning into line with the Court's reasoning in previous immunity cases. It would have indicated that the
magistrate's acts were of a discretionary judicial nature, requiring the
Pulliam Court to hold the suit for injunctive relief against her barred. 89
The Court avoided application of this reasoning by noting that immunity from prospective relief was not actually an issue. 9o Nevertheless, in
view of the holding in Consumers Union that attorney's fees may be
awarded only if the underlying suit is not barred,91 the Pulliam Court's
validation of the fees award counsels the conclusion that the Court approves prospective relief against judges.
The Pulliam Court was able to avoid the issue of immunity from
prospective relief because the case essentially turned on an interpretation
of § 1988. The Court should therefore have examined more closely the
magistrate's argument that Pierson v. Ray 92 requires § 1988 to be interpreted as prohibiting attorney's fees awards against state judges. 93 Had it
done so, the Court might have reasoned that Pierson's prohibition of suits
for damages was not inconsistent with the underlying intent of § 1988.
The plaintiffs in Pierson were the quintessential "unsatisfied litigants"
from whom the doctrine of immunity sought to protect judges. 94 In Pulliam, however, the plaintiffs were citizens seeking to enjoin future civil
rights violations by a magistrate. 95 The Court in Pulliam was thus
presented with an excellent opportunity to explain how Congress's intent
to permit attorney's fees awards against state judges was not inconsistent
with Pierson's prohibition against suits for damages; in effect, that judges
are only liable for costs when prospective relief is sought to cure judicial
conduct, but not decisions that restrict a person's civil rights. 96
88. 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); see supra note 36.
89. In determining what constitutes a judicial act, the Stump Court relied on McAlester
v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), a case analogous to Pulliam. In McAlester, the father of a criminal defendant was confined for a day when he inadvertently annoyed a judge in chambers. Although the confinement was ordered with
neither due process nor with any of the procedural requirements of contempt proceedings, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the judge had acted "in his judicial jurisdiction." 469 F.2d at 1282.
90. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981; see also supra note 58.
91. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, 446 U.S. 719, 739
(1980).
92. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
93. See Brief of Amici Curiae, State of Minnesota et af., at 8-9, Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.
Ct. 1970 (1984).
94. The record in Pierson indicated no unconstitutional acts or practices by the police
justice sued by convicted litigants. 386 U.S. at 553; see also supra note 32.
95. Plaintiffs Allen and Nicholson brought suit to enjoin the magistrate's practice of
incarcerating persons arrested for non-jailable offenses. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. They had only appeared before the magistrate at the bail hearing,
not as defendants in a trial on the merits. Compare Pierson, 386 U.S. 347 (1967)
with Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
96. This distinction is examined in Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 404-10 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. O'Shea v. Lit-
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The Court also failed to point out that the original concerns for judicial immunity - that judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences97 - have been
substantially vitiated because the burdens of litigation and accountability
for monetary awards have been largely shifted to state governments
through indemnification statutes. 98 Any arguments that the prospect of
large fee awards against the public funds would have an intimidating effect on conscientious jurists99 could have been countered with the overriding policy consideration that "the potential harm to the public from
denying immunity . . . is outweighed by the benefits of providing a
remedy." 100
The availability of attorney's fees awards in light of Pulliam v. Allen \01 is likely to result in a multiplicity of suits against state judges, an
anomolous result that the doctrine of judicial immunity was adopted to
prevent. \02 Yet, because the Pulliam Court's conclusion that judges are

97.

98.

99.

100.
101.
102.

tleton, 414 U.S. 488, vacated sub nom. Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974). Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) is also relevant. A Virginia county court judge
was indicted for excluding black citizens' names from grand and petit jury lists.
Confronted with the defense of judicial immunity, the Supreme Court considered
whether the selection of jurors was a judicial or ministerial act:
Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its
character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county
judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as
well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office
of a judge.
Id. at 348. The Court concluded that the challenged act was ministerial rather than
discretionary, and therefore held the judge answerable for the indictment. Cf
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (a judicial act is one that is judicial in
character).
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350 n.20 (1872) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R.-Ex., 220, 223 (1868)); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-110 (1982)
(except for wanton or willful acts); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4002 (Supp. 1982);
MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-404 (1984) (except for acts done with malice
or gross negligence). But see MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1408 (West 1968 &
Supp. 1984) (no indemnification provision); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-48-1 to -7 (2d
Repl. Vol. 1978) (repealed 1983).
Federal court fees awards, which would in most cases be paid from state coffers, are not violative of the eleventh amendment. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
693-98 (1978). See Fitzpatrick V. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress has plenary
power to set aside state's immunity to enforce the fourteenth amendment). See generally Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV.
682, 695 (1976).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 93, at 5-8; see also Gregoire V. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (threat of suit "would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties"),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 32 (1980).
104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
See Ito, A National Survey Shows Wide Variations in Actions Against Court Employees, STATE CT. J., Summer 1982, at 9, 14 (over 600 actions were initiated against
judges or court personnel in 1981).
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not immune from prospective relief was not properly before the Court, 103
the Court effectively has reserved the right in future cases to reverse an
order of prospective relief against a state judge. Further, by failing adequately to discuss the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act in light of
Pierson v. Ray,l04 Pulliam leaves unresolved whether Congress's apparent abrogation of judicial immunity for attorney's fees was intended to
stand beside or in lieu of the Supreme Court's holding of absolute immunity from damages suits. 105

Douglas N. Silber

103. Because the issue of immunity from prospective relief was not raised on appeal, see
supra note 58, the Court expressly refrained from ruling whether the injunction
order by the lower court was an appropriate remedy on the facts of this case. Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981; see also supra text accompanying note 90.
104. 386 U.S. '547 (1967); see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
105. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.

